NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH
NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH

Beyond Becker: Training in Imperfect Labor Markets

Daron Acemoglu, Jorn-Steffen Pischke

NBER Working Paper No. 6740
Issued in September 1998
NBER Program(s):   LS

In this paper, we survey non-competitive theories of training. With competitive labor markets, firms never pay for investments in general training, whereas when labor markets are imperfect, firm-sponsored training arises as an equilibrium phenomenon. We discuss a variety of evidence which support the predictions of non-competitive theories, and we draw some tentative policy conclusions from these models.

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Document Object Identifier (DOI): 10.3386/w6740

Published: Economic Journal, Vol.109 (February 1999): F112-F142. citation courtesy of

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