NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH
NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH

Foundations of Incomplete Contracts

Oliver Hart, John Moore

NBER Working Paper No. 6726
Issued in September 1998
NBER Program(s):   CF

In the last few years a new area has emerged in economic theory, which goes under the heading of However, almost since its inception, the theory has been under attack for its lack of rigorous foundations. In this paper, we evaluate some of the criticisms that have been made of the theory, in particular, those in Maskin and Tirole (1998a). In doing so, we develop a model that provides a rigorous foundation for the idea that contracts are incomplete.

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Document Object Identifier (DOI): 10.3386/w6726

Published: Review of Economic Studies, Vol. 66, no. 1 (1999): 115-138. citation courtesy of

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