NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH
NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH

Sect, Subsidy, and Sacrifice: An Economist's View of Ultra-Orthodox Jews

Eli Berman

NBER Working Paper No. 6715
Issued in August 1998
NBER Program(s):   LS

The Israeli Ultra-Orthodox population doubles each seventeen years. With 60 % of prime aged males attending Yeshiva rather than working, that community is rapidly outgrowing its resources. Why do fathers with families in poverty choose Yeshiva over work? Draft deferments subsidize Yeshiva attendance, yet attendance typically continues long after they are draft exempt. We explain this puzzle with a club good model in which Yeshiva attendance signals commitment to the community. Subsidizing membership in a club with sacrifice as an entry requirement induces increased sacrifice, compounding the distortion and dissipating the subsidy. Policies treating members and potential entrants equally are Pareto improving. The analysis may generalize to other by increasing the stringency of prohibitions and sacrifice.

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Document Object Identifier (DOI): 10.3386/w6715

Published: Quarterly Journal of Economics (August 2000). 6715 revised 10/26/00 citation courtesy of

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