TY  - JOUR
AU  - Gibbons,Robert
TI  - Incentives in Organizations
JF  - National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper Series
VL  - No. 6695
PY  - 1998
Y2  - August 1998
UR  - http://www.nber.org/papers/w6695
L1  - http://www.nber.org/papers/w6695.pdf
N1  - Author contact info:
Robert S. Gibbons
MIT Sloan School of Management
100 Main Street, E62-524
Cambridge, MA  02142
Tel: 617/253-0283
Fax: 617/253-2660
E-Mail: rgibbons@mit.edu
AB  - In this paper I summarize four new strands in agency theory that help me think about incentives in real organizations.  As a point of departure, I being with a quick sketch of the classic agency model.  I then discuss static models of objective performance measurement in which firms get what they pay for; repeated-game models of subjective performance assessments; incentives for skill development rather than simply for effort; and incentive contracts between versus within organizations.  I conclude by suggesting two avenues for further progress in agency theory: better integration with organizational economics, as launched by Coase and reinvigorated by Williamson, and cross-pollination with other fields that study organizations, including industrial relations, organizational sociology, and social psychology.
ER  -