@techreport{NBERw6695,
 title = "Incentives in Organizations",
 author = "Robert Gibbons",
 institution = "National Bureau of Economic Research",
 type = "Working Paper",
 series = "Working Paper Series",
 number = "6695",
 year = "1998",
 month = "August",
 URL = "http://www.nber.org/papers/w6695",
 abstract = {In this paper I summarize four new strands in agency theory that help me think about incentives in real organizations.  As a point of departure, I being with a quick sketch of the classic agency model.  I then discuss static models of objective performance measurement in which firms get what they pay for; repeated-game models of subjective performance assessments; incentives for skill development rather than simply for effort; and incentive contracts between versus within organizations.  I conclude by suggesting two avenues for further progress in agency theory: better integration with organizational economics, as launched by Coase and reinvigorated by Williamson, and cross-pollination with other fields that study organizations, including industrial relations, organizational sociology, and social psychology.},
}