TY  - JOUR
AU  - Porta,Rafael La
AU  - Lopez-de-Silane,Florencio
AU  - Shleifer,Andrei
AU  - Vishny,Robert
TI  - Agency Problems and Dividend Policies Around the World
JF  - National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper Series
VL  - No. 6594
PY  - 1998
Y2  - June 1998
UR  - http://www.nber.org/papers/w6594
L1  - http://www.nber.org/papers/w6594.pdf
N1  - Author contact info:
Rafael La Porta
Dartmouth College
Tuck School
210 Tuck Hall
Hanover, NH  03755
Tel: 603/646-3739
E-Mail: rafael.laporta@dartmouth.edu

Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes
EDHEC Business School
393, Promenade des Anglais BP 3116
06202 Nice Cedex 3
FRANCE
Tel: +33 (0) 4 93 18 78 07
Fax: +33 (0) 4 93 18 78 41
E-Mail: Florencio.lopezdesilanes@edhec.edu

Andrei Shleifer
Department of Economics
Harvard University
Littauer Center M-9
Cambridge, MA 02138
Tel: 617/495-5046
Fax: 617/496-1708
E-Mail: ashleifer@harvard.edu

Robert W. Vishny
Booth School of Business
The University of Chicago
5807 South Woodlawn Avenue
Chicago, IL  60637
Tel: 773/702-2522
Fax: 773/834-1920
E-Mail: Rvishny@gmail.com
AB  - This paper addresses the question of why firms pay dividends, the so-called outline two agency models of dividends.  On what we call outcome minority shareholders to force corporate outsiders to disgorge cash.  Under this model, stronger minority shareholder rights should be associated with higher dividends.  On what we call substitute a reputation for decent treatment of minority shareholders so that firms can raise equity finance in the future.  Under this model, stronger minority shareholder rights reduce the need for establishing a reputation, and so should be associated with lower dividends.  We compare these models on a cross-section of 4,000 companies from around the world, which operate in 33 countries with different levels of shareholder protection, and therefore different strength of minority shareholder rights.  The findings on payout levels and other results support the outcome agency model of dividends.
ER  -