NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH
NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH

Lobbying and Legislative Bargaining

Elhanan Helpman, Torsten Persson

NBER Working Paper No. 6589
Issued in June 1998
NBER Program(s):   ITI

We examine the effects of the interaction between lobbying and legislative bargaining on policy formation. Two systems are considered: a US-style congressional system and a European-style parliamentary system. First, we show that the policies generated are not intermediate between policies that would result from pure lobbying or from pure legislative bargaining. Second, we show that in congressional systems the resulting policies are strongly skewed in favor of the agenda-setter. In parliamentary systems they are skewed in favor of the coalition, but within the coalition there are many possible outcomes (there are multiple equilibria) with the agenda-setter having no particular advantage. Third, we show that equilibrium contributions are very small, despite the fact that lobbying has a marked effect on policies.

download in pdf format
   (1657 K)

email paper

This paper is available as PDF (1657 K) or via email.

Machine-readable bibliographic record - MARC, RIS, BibTeX

Document Object Identifier (DOI): 10.3386/w6589

Published: Advances in Economic Analysis & Policy, (B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy) Vol. 1: Iss. 1, Article 3 citation courtesy of

Users who downloaded this paper also downloaded these:
Baldwin and robert-nicoud w8756 Entry and Asymmetric Lobbying: Why Governments Pick Losers
Bertrand, Bombardini, and Trebbi w16765 Is It Whom You Know or What You Know? An Empirical Assessment of the Lobbying Process
de Figueiredo and Tiller w7726 The Structure and Conduct of Corporate Lobbying: How Firms Lobby the Federal Communications Commission
Igan, Mishra, and Tressel w17076 A Fistful of Dollars: Lobbying and the Financial Crisis
Celik, Karabay, and McLaren w17262 Trade Policy Making in a Model of Legislative Bargaining
 
Publications
Activities
Meetings
NBER Videos
Data
People
About

Support
National Bureau of Economic Research, 1050 Massachusetts Ave., Cambridge, MA 02138; 617-868-3900; email: info@nber.org

Contact Us