NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH
NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH

Outside Equity Financing

Stewart C. Myers

NBER Working Paper No. 6561
Issued in May 1998
NBER Program(s):   CF

This paper explores the necessary conditions for outside equity financing when insiders, that is managers or entrepreneurs, are self-interested and cash flows are not verifiable. Two control mechanisms are contrasted: a partnership,' in which outside investors can commit assets for a specified period, and a corporation,' in which assets are committed for an indefinite period but insiders can be ejected at any time. The paper also shows how going public to reduce outsiders' power can be efficient if it preserves appropriate incentives for insiders. The concluding section explains how the difficulty of verifying the act of investment leads to monitoring costs and insiders' pursuit of private benefits of control.

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Document Object Identifier (DOI): 10.3386/w6561

Published: The Journal of Finance, Vol.55, No.3, June 2000.

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