Voracity and Growth
NBER Working Paper No. 6498
We analyze an economy that lacks a strong legal-political institutional infrastructure an dis populated by multiple powerful groups. Powerful groups dynamically interact via fiscal process that effectively allows open access to the aggregate capital stock. In equilibrium, this leads to slow economic growth and a voracity effect,' by which a shock, such as a terms of trade windfall, perversely generates a more than proportionate increase in fiscal redistribution and reduces growth. We also show that a dilution in the concentration of power leads to faster growth and a less procyclical response to shocks.
Document Object Identifier (DOI): 10.3386/w6498
Published: Published as "Voracity and Growth in Discrete Time", EL, Vol. 62, no. 1(January 1999): 139-145.
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