@techreport{NBERw6473,
 title = "Chapter 11",
 author = "Lucian Arye Bebchuk",
 institution = "National Bureau of Economic Research",
 type = "Working Paper",
 series = "Working Paper Series",
 number = "6473",
 year = "1998",
 month = "March",
 URL = "http://www.nber.org/papers/w6473",
 abstract = {This essay surveys the literature on Chapter 11.  I start by discussing the objectives by which the performance of corporate reorganization rules is to be judged and then consider the fundamental problem of valuation that arises in corporate reorganization.  I next turn to examine the performance of the prevailing bargaining-based approach to reorganization, both in terms of its effect on total reorganization value and in terms of its effect on the division of this value.  Finally, I examine the two alternative approaches that have been put forward to the approach of existing rules -- that of auctioning the reorganized company's asset (put forward by Baird (1986) and Jensen (1991)) and that of using options to reorganize the company's ownership (put forward by Bebchuk (1988)).},
}