NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH
NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH

Chapter 11

Lucian Arye Bebchuk

NBER Working Paper No. 6473
Issued in March 1998
NBER Program(s):   CF   LE

This essay surveys the literature on Chapter 11. I start by discussing the objectives by which the performance of corporate reorganization rules is to be judged and then consider the fundamental problem of valuation that arises in corporate reorganization. I next turn to examine the performance of the prevailing bargaining-based approach to reorganization, both in terms of its effect on total reorganization value and in terms of its effect on the division of this value. Finally, I examine the two alternative approaches that have been put forward to the approach of existing rules -- that of auctioning the reorganized company's asset (put forward by Baird (1986) and Jensen (1991)) and that of using options to reorganize the company's ownership (put forward by Bebchuk (1988)).

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Document Object Identifier (DOI): 10.3386/w6473

Published: The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics and the Law (1998), pp. 219-224

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