NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH
NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH

Is Trade Policy for Sale? Congressional Voting on Recent Trade Bills

Robert E. Baldwin, Christopher S. Magee

NBER Working Paper No. 6376
Issued in January 1998
NBER Program(s):   ITI

This paper examines voting by members of Congress on three trade bills introduced in 1993 and 1994: the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), the agreements concluded in the Uruguay Round of multilateral trade negotiations (GATT), and most-favored nation status for China. We first review recnet political economy models of trade policy and then presenting a brief legislative history of the three bills, use these models to formulate an empirical specification of political behavior. In our empirical tests, we find evidence that campaign contributions given be political action committees influenced legislators' votes on both the NAFTA and GATT bills. Contributions from labor groups were associated with votes against freer trade, while contributions from business groups were associated with votes in favor of freer trade. We also find that the broad policy views of the legislators, industry employment in each member's state or congressional district, and general economic conditions in the district or state affected voting on the trade bills.

download in pdf format
   (1454 K)

email paper

This paper is available as PDF (1454 K) or via email.

Machine-readable bibliographic record - MARC, RIS, BibTeX

Document Object Identifier (DOI): 10.3386/w6376

Published: Baldwin, Robert E. and Christopher S. Magee. "Is Trade Policy For Sale? Congressional Voting On Recent Trade Bills," Public Choice, 2000, v105(1/2,Oct), 79-101. citation courtesy of

Users who downloaded this paper also downloaded these:
Dutt and Mitra w9239 Political Ideology and Endogenous Trade Policy: An Empirical Investigation
Goldberg and Maggi w5942 Protection for Sale: An Empirical Investigation
Grossman and Helpman w4149 Protection For Sale
Baldwin w15397 U.S. Trade Policy Since 1934: An Uneven Path Toward Greater Trade Liberalization
Rodriguez and Rodrik w7081 Trade Policy and Economic Growth: A Skeptic's Guide to Cross-National Evidence
 
Publications
Activities
Meetings
NBER Videos
Data
People
About

Support
National Bureau of Economic Research, 1050 Massachusetts Ave., Cambridge, MA 02138; 617-868-3900; email: info@nber.org

Contact Us