NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH
NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH

Taxes and Employment Subsidies in Optimal Redistribution Programs

Paul Beaudry, Charles Blackorby

NBER Working Paper No. 6355
Issued in January 1998
NBER Program(s):   LS   PE

This paper characterizes an optimal redistribution program when taxation authorities: (1)" are uninformed about individuals' value of time in both market and non-market activities observe both market-income and time allocated to market employment, and (3) are utilitarian. " Formally, the problem is a special case of a multidimensional screening problem with two" dimensions of unobserved attributes. In contrast to much of the optimal income taxation" literature, we show that optimal redistribution in this environment involves distorting market" employment upwards for low net-income individuals (through negative marginal income taxes or" employment subsidies) and distorting employment downward for high net-income individuals" (through positive marginal income taxes). It is also shown that workfare is only part of an" optimal program if certain individuals have not access to market employment."

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Document Object Identifier (DOI): 10.3386/w6355

Published: Paul Beaudry & Charles Blackorby & Dezso Szalay, 2009. "Taxes and Employment Subsidies in Optimal Redistribution Programs," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 99(1), pages 216-42, March.

 
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