TY  - JOUR
AU  - DiNardo,John
AU  - Hallock,Kevin
AU  - Pischke,Jorn-Steffen
TI  - Unions and Managerial Pay
JF  - National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper Series
VL  - No. 6318
PY  - 1997
Y2  - December 1997
UR  - http://www.nber.org/papers/w6318
L1  - http://www.nber.org/papers/w6318.pdf
N1  - Author contact info:
John DiNardo
Ford School of Public Policy
5238 Weill Hall
University of Michigan
Ann Arbor, MI  48109-3091
Tel: 734/647-7843
Fax: 734/763-9181
E-Mail: jdinardo@umich.edu

Kevin F. Hallock
ILR School
Cornell University
391 Ives Hall (East)
Ithaca, NY 14853
Tel: 607/255-3193
E-Mail:  kfh7@cornell.edu

Jorn-Steffen Pischke
CEP
London School of Economics
Houghton Street
London WC2A 2AE
UNITED KINGDOM
Tel: 44-20-7955-6509
Fax: 44-20-7955-7595
E-Mail: s.pischke@lse.ac.uk
AB  - Unions compress the wage distribution among workers covered by union contracts.  We" ask whether unions also have an effect on the managers of unionized firms.  To this end we" collected and assembled data on unionization and managerial pay within firms and industries in" the U.S. and across countries.  Generally, we find a negative correlation between executive" compensation and  unionization in our cross-section data, but no relationship of changes in" unionization on the growth of compensation of executives over time. Using NLRB elections" data, we find that a loss of union members due to decertification elections is associated with" higher CEO pay, although our estimates are imprecise.  With CPS data we consistently find that" where unions are stronger, fewer managers are employed.
ER  -