Social Security and Retirement in Japan
(930 K)
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NBER Working Paper No. 6156
Issued in September 1997
NBER Program(s): AG PE
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We provide the incentive mechanism of the public pension on the retirement decisions made in the Japanese labor market. Though the labor market participation of Japanese older persons is quite high by international standards, a principle incentive mechanism of the public pension system in Japan affecting the retirement behavior has many things in common with those in other OECD countries. The pension benefits are designed actuarially unfair,' and the decision to work beyond age 60 is penalized. As the population ages quite rapidly, it is wasteful to maintain the disincentive mechanism arising from the actuarially unfair pension scheme for older persons.
Published: Social Security and Retirement in Japan , Naohiro Yashiro, Takashi Oshio, in Social Security and Retirement around the World (1999), University of Chicago Press
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