NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH
NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH

Protection for Sale: An Empirical Investigation

Pinelopi Koujianou Goldbe, Giovanni Maggi

NBER Working Paper No. 5942
Issued in February 1997
NBER Program(s):   ITI

A prominent model in the recent political-economy literature on trade policy is Grossman and Helpman's (1994) Protection for Sale' model. This model yields clear predictions for the cross-sectional structure of trade protection. The objective of our" paper is to check whether the predictions of the Grossman-Helpman model are consistent with the data and, if the model finds support, to estimate its two key structural parameters: the government's valuation of welfare relative to contributions, and the fraction of the voting population represented by a lobby. We find that the pattern of protection in the U.S. in 1983 is consistent with the basic predictions of the model. Our estimate of the government's valuation of welfare relative to contributions is surprisingly high; the weight of welfare in the government's objective function is estimated to be between 50 and 88 times the weight of contributions.

download in pdf format
   (1382 K)

email paper

This paper is available as PDF (1382 K) or via email.

Machine-readable bibliographic record - MARC, RIS, BibTeX

Published: American Economic Review (December 1999): 1135-1155.

Users who downloaded this paper also downloaded these:
Grossman and Helpman w4149 Protection For Sale
Dutt and Mitra w9239 Political Ideology and Endogenous Trade Policy: An Empirical Investigation
Helpman w5309 Politics and Trade Policy
Findlay and Wellisz Endogenous Tariffs, the Political Economy of Trade Restrictions, and Welfare
Broda, Limao, and Weinstein w12033 Optimal Tariffs: The Evidence
 
Publications
Activities
Meetings
Data
People
About

Support
National Bureau of Economic Research, 1050 Massachusetts Ave., Cambridge, MA 02138; 617-868-3900; email: info@nber.org

Contact Us