NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH
NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH

Default and Renegotiation: A Dynamic Model of Debt

Oliver Hart, John Moore

NBER Working Paper No. 5907
Issued in January 1997
NBER Program(s):   CF

We analyze the role of debt in persuading an entrepreneur to pay out cash flows, rather than to divert them. In the first part of the paper we study the optimal debt contract -- specifically, the trade-off between the size of the loan and the repayment -- under the assumption that some debt contract is optimal. In the second part we consider a more general class of (non-debt) contracts, and derive sufficient conditions for debt to be optimal among these.

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Document Object Identifier (DOI): 10.3386/w5907

Published: Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 113, no. 1 (1998): 1-41. citation courtesy of

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