NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH
NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH

The Generalized War of Attrition

Jeremy Bulow, Paul Klemperer

NBER Working Paper No. 5872
Issued in January 1997
NBER Program(s):   PE

We generalize the War of Attrition model to allow for N + K firms competing for N prizes. Two special cases are of particular interest. First, if firms continue to pay their full costs after dropping out (as in a standard-setting context), each firm's exit time is independent both of K and of the actions of other players. Second, in the limit in which firms pay no costs after dropping out (as in a natural-oligopoly problem), the field is immediately reduced to N + 1 firms. Furthermore, we have perfect sorting, so it is always the K 1 lowest-value players who drop out in zero time, even though each player's value is private information to the player. We apply our model to politics, explaining the length of time it takes to collect a winning coalition to pass a bill.

download in pdf format
   (1015 K)

email paper

This paper is available as PDF (1015 K) or via email.

Machine-readable bibliographic record - MARC, RIS, BibTeX

Document Object Identifier (DOI): 10.3386/w5872

Published: American Economic Review, Vol. 89, no. 1 (March 1999): 175-189.

Users who downloaded this paper also downloaded these:
Alesina, Ardagna, and Trebbi w12049 Who Adjusts and When? On the Political Economy of Reforms
Platt, Price, and Tappen w15695 Pay-to-Bid Auctions
Alesina and Perotti w4637 The Political Economy of Budget Deficits
 
Publications
Activities
Meetings
NBER Videos
Data
People
About

Support
National Bureau of Economic Research, 1050 Massachusetts Ave., Cambridge, MA 02138; 617-868-3900; email: info@nber.org

Contact Us