TY  - JOUR
AU  - Frye,Timothy
AU  - Shleifer,Andrei
TI  - The Invisible Hand and the Grabbing Hand
JF  - National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper Series
VL  - No. 5856
PY  - 1996
Y2  - December 1996
UR  - http://www.nber.org/papers/w5856
L1  - http://www.nber.org/papers/w5856.pdf
N1  - Author contact info:
Andrei Shleifer
Department of Economics
Harvard University
Littauer Center M-9
Cambridge, MA 02138
Tel: 617/495-5046
Fax: 617/496-1708
E-Mail: ashleifer@harvard.edu
AB  - Evidence from a survey of 105 shop-owners in Moscow and Warsaw shows that the reliance on private protection, as well as the burden of regulation and corruption, are much greater in Moscow. The evidence suggests that the `invisible hand' model of government better fits the Warsaw local government, and the`grabbing hand' model is more appropriate for Moscow.  The evidence implies that the singular focus on the speed of economic reforms to understand the success of transition is misplaced, and that the quality of government may be as essential.
ER  -