TY  - JOUR
AU  - Joskow,Paul L.
AU  - Schmalensee,Richard
AU  - Bailey,Elizabeth M.
TI  - Auction Design and the Market for Sulfur Dioxide Emissions
JF  - National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper Series
VL  - No. 5745
PY  - 1996
Y2  - September 1996
UR  - http://www.nber.org/papers/w5745
L1  - http://www.nber.org/papers/w5745.pdf
N1  - Author contact info:
Paul L. Joskow
Alfred P. Sloan Foundation
E-Mail: joskow@sloan.org

Richard Schmalensee
MIT Sloan School of Management
100 Main Street, E62-520
Cambridge, MA 02142
Tel: 617/253-2957
Fax: 617/258-6617
E-Mail: rschmal@mit.edu

Elizabeth M. Bailey
AB  - Title IV of the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990 created a market for electric utility emissions of sulfur dioxide (SO2).  Recent papers have argued that flaws in the design of the auctions that are part of this market have adversely affected its performance. These papers incorrectly assume that trade can only occur at auctions, however.  Our empirical analysis of the SO2 emissions market shows that the auctions have become a small part of a relatively efficient market and that the auction design problems that have attracted the most attention have had no effect on actual market prices
ER  -