@techreport{NBERw5710,
 title = "Why Clashes Between Internal and External Stability Goals End in Currency Crises, 1797-1994",
 author = "Michael D. Bordo and Anna J. Schwartz",
 institution = "National Bureau of Economic Research",
 type = "Working Paper",
 series = "Working Paper Series",
 number = "5710",
 year = "1997",
 month = "June",
 URL = "http://www.nber.org/papers/w5710",
 abstract = {We argue that recent currency crises reflect clashes between fundamentals and pegged exchange rates, just as did crises in the past.  We reject the view that crises reflect self-fulfilling prophecies that are not closely related to measured fundamentals. Doubts about the timing of a market attack on a currency are less important than the fact that it is bound to happen if a government's policies are inconsistent with pegged exchange rates.  We base these conclusions on a review of currency crises in the historical record under metallic monetary regimes and of crises post-World War II under Bretton Woods, and since, in European and Latin American pegged exchange rate regimes.},
}