@techreport{NBERw5705,
 title = "Incentives and Careers in Organizations",
 author = "Robert Gibbons",
 institution = "National Bureau of Economic Research",
 type = "Working Paper",
 series = "Working Paper Series",
 number = "5705",
 year = "1997",
 month = "October",
 URL = "http://www.nber.org/papers/w5705",
 abstract = {This paper surveys two related pieces of the labor-economics literature:  incentive pay and careers in organizations.  In the discussion of incentives, I first summarize theory and evidence related to the classic agency model, which emphasizes the tradeoff between insurance and incentives.  I then offer econometric and case-study evidence suggesting that this classic model ignores several crucial issues and sketch new models that begin to analyze these issues.  In the discussion of careers in organizations, I begin by summarizing evidence on wages and positions using panel data within firms.  This evidence is sparse and far-flung (drawn from industrial relations, organizational behavior, and sociology, as well as from labor economics); I identify ten basic questions that merit more systematic investigation.  Turning to theory, I describe building-block models that address one or a few pieces of evidence, but focus on more recent models that address broad patterns of evidence.},
}