TY  - JOUR
AU  - Alesina,Alberto
AU  - Spolaore,Enrico
TI  - International Conflict, Defense Spending and the Size of Countries
JF  - National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper Series
VL  - No. 5694
PY  - 1996
Y2  - August 1996
UR  - http://www.nber.org/papers/w5694
L1  - http://www.nber.org/papers/w5694.pdf
N1  - Author contact info:
Alberto F. Alesina
Department of Economics
Harvard University
Littauer Center 210
Cambridge, MA 02138
Tel: 617/495-8388
Fax: 617/495-7730
E-Mail: aalesina@harvard.edu

Enrico Spolaore
Department of Economics
Tufts University
Braker Hall 315
8 Upper Campus Road
Medford, MA 02155
Tel: 617/627-4068
Fax: 617/627-3917
E-Mail: enrico.spolaore@tufts.edu
AB  - This paper provides a formal model of endogenous country formation and of choice of defense spending in a world with international conflict.  The model is consistent with three observations.  First, secessions and, more generally, break-up of countries should follow a reduction in the likelihood of international conflict.  Second, the number of regional conflicts between smaller countries may increase as a result of the break-up of larger countries.  Third, the size of the peace divided -- i.e., the reduction in the defense spending in a more peaceful world -- is limited by the process of country break-up.
ER  -