@techreport{NBERw5666,
 title = "Exclusive Dealing",
 author = "B. Douglas Bernheim and Michael D. Whinston",
 institution = "National Bureau of Economic Research",
 type = "Working Paper",
 series = "Working Paper Series",
 number = "5666",
 year = "1996",
 month = "July",
 URL = "http://www.nber.org/papers/w5666",
 abstract = {In this paper, we provide a conceptual framework for understanding the phenomenon of exclusive dealing, and we explore the motivations for and effects of its use.  For a broad class of models, we characterize the outcome of a contracting game in which manufacturers may employ exclusive dealing provisions in their contracts.  We then apply this characterization to a sequence of specialized settings.  We demonstrate that exclusionary contractual provisions may be irrelevant, anticompetitive, or efficiency-enhancing, depending upon the setting.  More specifically, we exhibit the potential for anticompetitive effects in non-coincident markets (that is, markets other than the ones in which exclusive dealing is practiced), and we explore the potential for the enhancement of efficiency in a setting where common representation gives rise to incentive conflicts.  In each instance, we describe the manner in which equilibrium outcomes would be altered by a ban on exclusive dealing.  We demonstrate that a ban may have surprisingly subtle and unintended effects.},
}