NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH
NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH

The Costs and Benefits of Fiscal Rules: Evidence from U.S. States

Alberto Alesina, Tamim Bayoumi

NBER Working Paper No. 5614
Issued in June 1996
NBER Program(s):   ME   PE

This paper shows that in American states balanced budget rules are effective in enforcing fiscal discipline but they have no costs in terms of increased output variability. More specifically, we show that tighter fiscal rules are associated with larger average surplus and lower cyclical variability of the budget balance. However, the lower flexibility of the budget balance does not affect state output variability.

download in pdf format
   (430 K)

email paper

Machine-readable bibliographic record - MARC, RIS, BibTeX

Document Object Identifier (DOI): 10.3386/w5614

Published: Published as "Together or Separately? Issues on the Costs and Benefits of Political and Fiscal Unions", European Economic Review, Vol. 39, nos. 3-4(1995).

Users who downloaded this paper also downloaded* these:
Buiter and Patel w15934 Fiscal Rules in India: Are They Effective?
Alesina and Perotti w4637 The Political Economy of Budget Deficits
Alesina and Perotti Budget Deficits and Budget Institutions
Auerbach w14288 Federal Budget Rules: The US Experience
Bohn and Inman w5533 Balanced Budget Rules and Public Deficits: Evidence from the U.S. States
 
Publications
Activities
Meetings
NBER Videos
Themes
Data
People
About

National Bureau of Economic Research, 1050 Massachusetts Ave., Cambridge, MA 02138; 617-868-3900; email: info@nber.org

Contact Us