TY  - JOUR
AU  - Salkever,David S.
AU  - Frank,Richard G.
TI  - Economic Issues in Vaccine Purchase Arrangements
JF  - National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper Series
VL  - No. 5248
PY  - 1995
Y2  - September 1995
UR  - http://www.nber.org/papers/w5248
L1  - http://www.nber.org/papers/w5248.pdf
N1  - Author contact info:
David S. Salkever
UMBC
Department of Public Policy
1000 Hilltop Circle, Public Policy 418
Baltimore, MD  21250
Tel: 410/455-8459
Fax: 410-455-8066
E-Mail: salkever@umbc.edu

Richard Frank
Department of Health Care Policy
Harvard Medical School
180 Longwood Avenue
Boston, MA 02115
Tel: 617/432-0178
Fax: 617/432-1219
E-Mail: frank@hcp.med.harvard.edu
AB  - Federal purchases of major childhood vaccines account for roughly half of the total market for these vaccines.  This paper examines Federal purchasing practices in the context of the recent literature on bidding and procurement, and compares these practices to UNICEF vaccine procurement arrangements.  Federal contracts were awarded to a single winner and the firms eligible to bid were limited in number (since the number of U.S. licensed firms is small).  Since production capacity cannot be expanded quickly, and the Federal share of purchases is large, it is hypothesized that firms' bid prices will be higher for larger contracts.  The paper analyzes contracts over the period 1977 through 1992 to determine the contract size-price relationship, as well as effects on contract prices of 1) the National Vaccine Injury Compensation Program enacted in 1987 and 2) changes in numbers of firms in the market.  Results provide equivocal support for a positive size-price relationship and evidence of a positive price effect of the injury compensation program.
ER  -