TY  - JOUR
AU  - Berry,Steven
AU  - Levinsohn,James
AU  - Pakes,Ariel
TI  - Voluntary Export Restraints on Automobiles: Evaluating a Strategic TradePolicy
JF  - National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper Series
VL  - No. 5235
PY  - 1995
Y2  - August 1995
UR  - http://www.nber.org/papers/w5235
L1  - http://www.nber.org/papers/w5235.pdf
N1  - Author contact info:
Steven T. Berry
Yale University Department of Economics
Box 208264
37 Hillhouse Avenue
New Haven, CT 06520-8264
Tel: 203/432-3556
Fax: 203/432-6323
E-Mail: steven.berry@yale.edu

James A. Levinsohn
Yale School of Management
PO Box 208200
New Haven, CT  06520
Tel: 734/763-2319
Fax: 734/764-2769
E-Mail: James.Levinsohn@yale.edu

Ariel Pakes
Department of Economics
Harvard University
Littauer Room 117
Cambridge, MA 02138
Tel: 617/495-5320
Fax: 617/496-7352
E-Mail: apakes@fas.harvard.edu
AB  - In May, 1981, a voluntary export restraint (VER) was placed on exports of automobiles from Japan to the United States.  As trade policies go, this one was important.  At about the same time, though to much less fanfare, international trade theorists were obtaining (then) startling results from models of international trade in imperfectly competitive markets.  These models suggested that in imperfectly competitive markets, an activist trade policy might enhance national welfare.  In this paper, we provide some empirical evidence on whether these new theoretical possibilities might actually apply to the policy of VERs.
ER  -