NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH
NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH

How Does Privatization Work? Evidence from the Russian Shops

Nicholas Barberis, Maxim Boycko, Andrei Shleifer, Natalia Tsukanova

NBER Working Paper No. 5136
Issued in May 1995
NBER Program(s):   CF   LS   PE

We use a survey of 452 Russian shops, most of which were privatized between 1992 and 1993, to measure the importance of alternative channels through which privatization promotes restructuring. Restructuring is measured as capital renovation, change in suppliers, increase in hours that stores stay open, and layoffs. There is strong evidence that the presence of new owners and new managers raises the likelihood of restructuring. In contrast, there is no evidence that equity incentives of old managers promote restructuring. The evidence points to the critical role that new human capital plays in economic transformation.

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Document Object Identifier (DOI): 10.3386/w5136

Published: Journal of Political Economy, vol.104, no.4, 1996. citation courtesy of

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