NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH
NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH

Sovereign Debt

Jonathan Eaton, Raquel Fernandez

NBER Working Paper No. 5131
Issued in May 1995
NBER Program(s):   ITI   IFM

We review the literature on sovereign debt. We organize our survey around three central questions: (1) Why do sovereign debtors ever repay their debts? (2) What burdens, in the form of distortions and inefficiencies, does sovereign debt impose? and (3) How might debt be restructured to reduce these burdens? In grappling with the first question the literature has pointed to, and argued about, the roles of reputation, punishments, rewards and renegotiation. In addressing the second the literature has asked whether sovereign debtors tend to borrow too much or too little, and how debt can distort the domestic economy. Answers to the third question include measures by creditors, by debtors, and by public institutions to reduce debt burdens.

download in pdf format
   (1251 K)

email paper

This paper is available as PDF (1251 K) or via email.

Machine-readable bibliographic record - MARC, RIS, BibTeX

Document Object Identifier (DOI): 10.3386/w5131

Published:

  • Handbook of International Economics, vol. 3, G. Grossman and K. Rogoff,eds., (Amsterdam: North-Holland, 1995), pp. 2032-2077
  • Eaton, Jonathan, 1996. "Sovereign Debt, Reputation and Credit Terms," International Journal of Finance & Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 1(1), pages 25-35, January.

Users who downloaded this paper also downloaded these:
Grossman and Van Huyck w1673 Sovereign Debt as a Contingent Claim: Excusable Default, Repudiation, and Reputation
Eaton w3424 Sovereign Debt, Reputation, and Credit Terms
Eaton, Gersovitz, and Stiglitz w1894 The Pure Theory of Country Risk
Rose w8853 One Reason Countries Pay their Debts: Renegotiation and International Trade
Shleifer w9493 Will the Sovereign Debt Market Survive?
 
Publications
Activities
Meetings
NBER Videos
Data
People
About

Support
National Bureau of Economic Research, 1050 Massachusetts Ave., Cambridge, MA 02138; 617-868-3900; email: info@nber.org

Contact Us