NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH
NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH

Product Development and the Timing of Information Disclosure under U.S.and Japanese Patent Systems

Reiko Aoki, Thomas J. Prusa

NBER Working Paper No. 5063
Issued in March 1995
NBER Program(s):   ITI

This paper examines the consequences of the differences in the timing of information disclosure between the U.S. and Japanese patent systems. Under the Japanese system it is possible for a firm to apply for a patent knowing the exact specifications of a rival's patent application. In contrast, in the U.S. the only way a firm learns about a rival's innovation is upon the actual granting of the rival's patent. We argue that this difference enables Japanese firms to coordinate their R&D efforts better than their U.S. counterparts and that this, in turn, leads to smaller quality improvements under the Japanese system. We show that the creation/diffusion tradeoff of patents can be influenced not only by the scope and length of patent protection but also by other features of the patenting process.

download in pdf format
   (299 K)

email paper

This paper is available as PDF (299 K) or via email.

Machine-readable bibliographic record - MARC, RIS, BibTeX

Document Object Identifier (DOI): 10.3386/w5063

Published: Journal of the Japanese and International Economies, 10(3), (September 1996), pp. 233-249.

Users who downloaded this paper also downloaded these:
Johnson and Popp w8374 Forced Out of the Closet: The Impact of the American Inventors Protection Act on the Timing of Patent Disclosure
 
Publications
Activities
Meetings
Data
People
About

Support
National Bureau of Economic Research, 1050 Massachusetts Ave., Cambridge, MA 02138; 617-868-3900; email: info@nber.org

Contact Us