NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH
NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH

Top Executives, Turnover and Firm Performance in Germany

Steven N. Kaplan

NBER Working Paper No. 4416
Issued in August 1993
NBER Program(s):   CF

This paper examines executive turnover -- both for management and supervisory boards - - and its relation to firm performance in the largest companies in Germany in the 1980s. The management board turns over slowly -- at a rate of 10% per year -- implying that top executives in Germany have longer tenures than their counterparts in the U.S. and Japan. Turnover of the management board increases significantly with stock performance and particularly poor (i.e. negative) earnings, but is unrelated to sales growth and earnings growth. Turnover of the supervisory board is not consistently related to any measure of performance.

download in pdf format
   (1413 K)

download in djvu format
   (161 K)

email paper

This paper is available as PDF (1413 K) or DjVu (161 K) (Download viewer) or via email.

Machine-readable bibliographic record - MARC, RIS, BibTeX

Document Object Identifier (DOI): 10.3386/w4416

Published: Journal of Law, Economics & Organization, Vol. 10, No. 1 (April 1994), pp. 142-159. citation courtesy of

Users who downloaded this paper also downloaded these:
Kaplan w4065 Top Executive Rewards and Firm Performance: A Comparison of Japan and the U.S.
Jenter and Kanaan w12068 CEO Turnover and Relative Performance Evaluation
Kaplan and Minton w12465 How has CEO Turnover Changed? Increasingly Performance Sensitive Boards and Increasingly Uneasy CEOs
Adams, Hermalin, and Weisbach w14486 The Role of Boards of Directors in Corporate Governance: A Conceptual Framework and Survey
Bebchuk and Fried w9813 Executive Compensation as an Agency Problem
 
Publications
Activities
Meetings
NBER Videos
Data
People
About

Support
National Bureau of Economic Research, 1050 Massachusetts Ave., Cambridge, MA 02138; 617-868-3900; email: info@nber.org

Contact Us