TY  - JOUR
AU  - Inman,Robert P.
TI  - Presidential Leadership and the Reform of Fiscal Policy: Learning from Reagan's Role in TRA 86
JF  - National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper Series
VL  - No. 4395
PY  - 1993
Y2  - July 1993
UR  - http://www.nber.org/papers/w4395
L1  - http://www.nber.org/papers/w4395.pdf
N1  - Author contact info:
Robert P. Inman
Department of Finance
Wharton School
University of Pennsylvania
Philadelphia, PA  19104-6367
Tel: 215/898-8299
Fax: 215/898-6200
E-Mail: inman@wharton.upenn.edu
AB  - The institutions of federal fiscal-policy making seem incapable of confronting the central domestic issues of the day. This paper presents a model of congressional decision-making in which legislators' incentives are contrary to fiscal efficiency. In such an environment, a "strong" president may be able to lead congress away from inefficient budgets. The paper specifies a model of what constitutes a strong president, namely a president with resources to build congressional coalitions and a credible veto to force "all-or-nothing" choices between reform and the inefficient status quo. President Reagan's role in the passage of the Tax Reform Act of 1986 is detailed in the light of this model; the analysis reveals the role of executive resources and the importance of the veto strategy to major fiscal reform.
ER  -