TY  - JOUR
AU  - Shleifer,Andrei
AU  - Vishny,Robert W.
TI  - Corruption
JF  - National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper Series
VL  - No. 4372
PY  - 1993
Y2  - May 1993
UR  - http://www.nber.org/papers/w4372
L1  - http://www.nber.org/papers/w4372.pdf
N1  - Author contact info:
Andrei Shleifer
Department of Economics
Harvard University
Littauer Center M-9
Cambridge, MA 02138
Tel: 617/495-5046
Fax: 617/496-1708
E-Mail: ashleifer@harvard.edu

Robert W. Vishny
Booth School of Business
The University of Chicago
5807 South Woodlawn Avenue
Chicago, IL  60637
Tel: 773/702-2522
Fax: 773/834-1920
E-Mail: Rvishny@gmail.com
AB  - This paper presents two propositions about corruption. First, the structure of government institutions and the political process are a very important determinant of the level of corruption. In particular, weak governments which do not control their agencies would lead to ultra-high corruption levels. Second, the illegality of corruption and the need for secrecy make it much more distortionary and costly than its sister activity, taxation. These results may explain why in some less developed countries, corruption is so high and so costly to development.
ER  -