NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH
NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH

The Political Economy of Capital Controls

Alberto Alesina, Vittorio Grilli, Gian Maria Milesi-Ferrett

NBER Working Paper No. 4353
Issued in May 1993
NBER Program(s):   IFM

This paper calculates international income transfers which implement a Pareto optimal trade equilibrium in a world where many countries trade many goods.

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Document Object Identifier (DOI): 10.3386/w4353

Published: Published as "The Political Economy of Fiscal Adjustments", BP, Vol. 28,no. 1 (1998): 197-248.

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