NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH
NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH

The Political Economy of Controls: Complexity

Anne O. Krueger, Roderick Duncan

NBER Working Paper No. 4351
Issued in April 1993
NBER Program(s):International Finance and Macroeconomics, International Trade and Investment

Increasing complexity of regulation over time is a regular empirical phenomenon whenever political processes attempt to control economic activity. In this paper it is argued that a tendency toward increasing complexity of controls is probably inherent in most efforts to regulate, and that the great likelihood that it will occur should be taken into account in initial policy formulation. Economic policy analyses may be correct as formulated on the assumption that the initial policies will be adopted and not be altered, but be wrong if it is recognized that increased complexity may be an inevitable cost of the policy.

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Document Object Identifier (DOI): 10.3386/w4351

Published: Stetting, Lange, Knad Erik Svendsen, and Ebbi Yndgaard (eds.) Global Change and Transformation. Copenhagen: Handelshoyskolens Forlag, 1993.

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