TY  - JOUR
AU  - Kantor,Shawn Everett
AU  - Legros,Patrick
TI  - The Economic Consequences of Legislative Oversight:  Theory and Evidencefrom the Medical Profession
JF  - National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper Series
VL  - No. 4281
PY  - 1993
Y2  - February 1993
UR  - http://www.nber.org/papers/w4281
L1  - http://www.nber.org/papers/w4281.pdf
N1  - Author contact info:
Shawn E. Kantor
School of Social Sciences, Humanities and Arts
University of California, Merced
5200 N. Lake Road
Merced, CA 95343
Tel: 209-228-2956
Fax: 209-228-4007
E-Mail: skantor@ucmerced.edu

Patrick Legros
ECARES, Universite Libre de Bruxelles
CP114
50 avenue Franklin Roosevelt
1050 Brussels BELGIUM
E-Mail: plegros@ulb.ac.be
AB  - This paper provides a positive analysis of how formal, periodic legislative oversight of regulatory agencies can influence market outcomes and the welfare of regulated industries. Whereas previous research has focused on the political distinction between passive and active legislative oversight, this paper shows that there exists an important economic difference between two mechanisms as well. We develop a principal-agent model that describes how a regulatory agent's incentives are influenced if its actions are publicly scrutinized. Our empirical analysis supports our claim that formal oversight leads to measurable economic effects.
ER  -