TY  - JOUR
AU  - Kaplow,Louis
TI  - Shifting Plaintiffs' Fees versus Increasing Damage Awards
JF  - National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper Series
VL  - No. 4263
PY  - 1994
Y2  - February 1994
UR  - http://www.nber.org/papers/w4263
L1  - http://www.nber.org/papers/w4263.pdf
N1  - Author contact info:
Louis Kaplow
Harvard University
Hauser 322
Cambridge, MA  02138
Tel: 617/495-4101
Fax: 617/496-4880
E-Mail: meskridge@law.harvard.edu
AB  - Shifting successful plaintiffs' fees to defendants and increasing damage awards are alternative ways to achieve similar results: increasing plaintiffs' incentives to sue and raising defendants' expected payments. This paper shows that relying on higher damage awards is more efficient than shifting plaintiffs' fees. The reason is that fee-shifting is, perversely, more valuable for plaintiffs with higher litigation costs. Thus, it is possible to substitute higher damage awards for fee-shifting in a manner that leaves deterrence unaffected while eliminating the suits of plaintiffs with the highest litigation costs.
ER  -