@techreport{NBERw4263,
 title = "Shifting Plaintiffs' Fees versus Increasing Damage Awards",
 author = "Louis Kaplow",
 institution = "National Bureau of Economic Research",
 type = "Working Paper",
 series = "Working Paper Series",
 number = "4263",
 year = "1994",
 month = "February",
 URL = "http://www.nber.org/papers/w4263",
 abstract = {Shifting successful plaintiffs' fees to defendants and increasing damage awards are alternative ways to achieve similar results: increasing plaintiffs' incentives to sue and raising defendants' expected payments. This paper shows that relying on higher damage awards is more efficient than shifting plaintiffs' fees. The reason is that fee-shifting is, perversely, more valuable for plaintiffs with higher litigation costs. Thus, it is possible to substitute higher damage awards for fee-shifting in a manner that leaves deterrence unaffected while eliminating the suits of plaintiffs with the highest litigation costs.},
}