TY  - JOUR
AU  - Blanchard,Olivier J.
AU  - Lopez-de-Silane,Florencio
TI  - What do Firms do with Cash Windfalls?
JF  - National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper Series
VL  - No. 4258
PY  - 1993
Y2  - January 1993
UR  - http://www.nber.org/papers/w4258
L1  - http://www.nber.org/papers/w4258.pdf
N1  - Author contact info:
Olivier J. Blanchard
International Monetary Fund
Economic Counsellor and Director
Research Department
700 19th Street, NW
Rm. 10-700
Washington DC, 20431
Tel: 202-623-7825
Fax: 202-623-7271
E-Mail: blanchar@mit.edu

Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes
EDHEC Business School
393, Promenade des Anglais BP 3116
06202 Nice Cedex 3
France
Tel: +33 (0) 4 93 18 78 07
Fax: +33 (0) 4 93 18 78 41
E-Mail: Florencio.lopezdesilanes@edhec.edu
AB  - Suppose that a firm receives a cash windfall which does not change its investment opportunity set, or equivalently its marginal Tobin's Q. What will this firm do with the money? We provide empirical answers to this question using a sample of firms with such windfalls in the form of a won or settled lawsuit. We examine a variety of decisions of the firm to shed light on alternative theories of corporate financing and investment. Our evidence is broadly inconsistent with the perfect capital markets model. The results need to be stretched considerably to fit the asymmetric information model in which managers act in the interest of shareholders. The evidence supports the agency model of managerial behavior, in which managers try to ensure the long run survival and independence of the firms with themselves at the helm.
ER  -