NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH
NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH

Accuracy in the Determination of Liability

Louis Kaplow, Steven Shavell

NBER Working Paper No. 4203 (Also Reprint No. r1899)
Issued in October 1992
NBER Program(s):   LE

Many legal rules, notably rules of procedure and evidence, are concerned with achieving accuracy in the outcome of adjudication. In this article, we study accuracy in the conventional model of law enforcement. We consider why reducing error in determining liability is socially valuable and how error and its reduction affect the optimal probability and magnitude of sanctions.

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Document Object Identifier (DOI): 10.3386/w4203

Published: Journal of Law and Economics, Vol. XXXVII, pp. 1-15, (April 1994).

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