@techreport{NBERw4145,
 title = "Discouraging Rivals: Managerial Rent-Seeking and Economic Inefficiencies",
 author = "Joseph E. Stiglitz and Aaron S. Edlin",
 institution = "National Bureau of Economic Research",
 type = "Working Paper",
 series = "Working Paper Series",
 number = "4145",
 year = "1997",
 month = "May",
 URL = "http://www.nber.org/papers/w4145",
 abstract = {We argue here for a broader view of the biases in managers' decisions: In general, managerial rent-seeking affects not only the level of investment, but also the form. Our basic hypothesis is simple: given the now well-established scope for managerial discretion, managers have an incentive to exercise that discretion to enhance their income. Any managerial contract is subject to renegotiation, and a manager's pay is the outcome of an often bewildering bargaining process between management, the board of directors, and rival management teams or takeover artists.},
}