TY  - JOUR
AU  - Lambson,Val Eugene
AU  - Richardson,J. David
TI  - Empirical Evidence for Collusion in the U.S. Auto Market?
JF  - National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper Series
VL  - No. 4111
PY  - 1992
Y2  - June 1992
UR  - http://www.nber.org/papers/w4111
L1  - http://www.nber.org/papers/w4111.pdf
N1  - Author contact info:
J. David Richardson
Department of Economics
347 Eggers Hall
Syracuse University
Syracuse, NY 13244-1090
Tel: 315/443-4339;3843
Fax: 315/443-9085;202/328-5432
E-Mail: JDRICHAR@MAXWELL.SYR.EDU
AB  - A supergame theoretic price-setting model of collusion is calibrated to data from the North American passenger car market before, during, and after the voluntary restraint arrangements (VRAs) with Japan. Conclusions about whether the model is consistent with the bans from the various regimes depend on assumptions about market structure, demand elasticities, and discount factors. If one believes that the price elasticity of auto demand is about one, for example, then the calibrations suggest that in, the pre-VRA and VRA regimes, only General Motors and Ford could conceivably have colluded, and even this limited potential broke down in the post-VRA regime.
ER  -