TY  - JOUR
AU  - Bebchuk,Lucian Arye
AU  - Kaplow,Louis
TI  - Optimal Sanctions When Individuals are Imperfectly Informed About the Probability of Apprehension
JF  - National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper Series
VL  - No. 4079
PY  - 1992
Y2  - October 1992
UR  - http://www.nber.org/papers/w4079
L1  - http://www.nber.org/papers/w4079.pdf
N1  - Author contact info:
Lucian A. Bebchuk
Harvard Law School
1545 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
Tel: 617/495-3138
Fax: 617/812-0554
E-Mail: bebchuk@law.harvard.edu

Louis Kaplow
Harvard University
Hauser 322
Cambridge, MA  02138
Tel: 617/495-4101
Fax: 617/496-4880
E-Mail: meskridge@law.harvard.edu
AB  - This paper considers optimal enforcement when individuals may be imperfectly informed about the probability of apprehension. When individuals are perfectly informed, optimal sanctions are maximal because, as Gary Becker (1968) suggested, society can economize on enforcement resources by reducing the probability of apprehension while increasing sanctions. But when individuals imperfectly observe the probability of apprehension, it may be optimal to apply lower sanctions while expending more enforcement resources.
ER  -