TY  - JOUR
AU  - Kovenock,Dan
AU  - Thursby,Marie
TI  - GATT, Dispute Settlement and Cooperation
JF  - National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper Series
VL  - No. 4071
PY  - 1992
Y2  - May 1992
UR  - http://www.nber.org/papers/w4071
L1  - http://www.nber.org/papers/w4071.pdf
N1  - Author contact info:
Marie C. Thursby
College of Management
Georgia Institute of Technology
800 West Peachtree Street, NW
Atlanta, GA 30308-1149
Tel: 404/894-6249
Fax: 404/385-4894
E-Mail: marie.thursby@mgt.gatech.edu
AB  - This paper analyzes GATT and its dispute settlement procedure (DSP) in the context of a supergame model of international trade featuring both explicit and implicit agreements. An explicit agreement, such as GATT, may be violated at some positive cost in addition to retaliatory actions that might be induced by the violation. We interpret this cost as arising from 'international obligation," a phenomenon frequently mentioned in the legal literature on GATT. We focus on how international obligation affects two aspects of GAIT-DSP: unilateral retaliation and the effect of inordinate delays in the operation of DSP.
ER  -