TY  - JOUR
AU  - Bordo,Michael D.
TI  - The Bretton Woods International Monetary System: An Historical Overview
JF  - National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper Series
VL  - No. 4033
PY  - 1993
Y2  - March 1993
UR  - http://www.nber.org/papers/w4033
L1  - http://www.nber.org/papers/w4033.pdf
N1  - Author contact info:
Michael D. Bordo
Department of Economics
Rutgers University
New Jersey Hall
75 Hamilton Street
New Brunswick, NJ 08901
Tel: 732/822-7152
Fax: 732/932-7416
E-Mail: bordo@econ.rutgers.edu
M1  - published as Michael D. Bordo. "The Bretton Woods International Monetary System: A Historical Overview," in Michael D. Bordo and Barry Eichengreen, editors, "A Retrospective on the Bretton Woods System: Lessons for International Monetary Reform" University of Chicago Press (1993)

AB  - This paper presents an overview of the Bretton Woods experience. From an historical perspective. I analyze its performance relative to other international monetary regimes. its origins. its operation. its problems and its demise. In the survey I emphasize both issues deemed important at the time and raise questions which may be of interest for the concerns of the present. Part 2 compares the macro performance of Bretton Woods with preceding and subsequent monetary regimes. The descriptive statistics on nine key macro variables point to one startling conclusion -- the Bretton Woods system. in its full convertibility phase 1959-1971, was the most stable regime for both nominal and real variables in the past century. Part 3 surveys the origins of Bretton Woods: the perceived problems of the inter war period; the plans for a new international monetary order and the steps leading to the outcome -- the Articles of Agreement. Part 4 examines the preconvertibility period from 1946 to 1958: the problems in getting the system started including the dollar shortage and the weakness of the IMF; and how the system evolved to convertibility and the gold dollar standard. Part 5 analyzes the heyday of Bretton Woods 1959 to 1971 in the context of the gold dollar standard and the famous three problems: adjustment. liquidity, and confidence. Part 6 considers the emergence of a "de facto" dollar standard in 1968 and its collapse in the face of a massive U.S. induced inflation. Part 7 considers why Bretton Woods was so stable and yet so short-lived. It also considers the importance of adherence to credible rules in the design of an effective international monetary system.
ER  -