TY  - JOUR
AU  - Alesina,Alberto
AU  - Cohen,Gerald D.
AU  - Roubini,Nouriel
TI  - Macroeconomic Policy and Elections in OECD Democracies
JF  - National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper Series
VL  - No. 3830
PY  - 1991
Y2  - September 1991
UR  - http://www.nber.org/papers/w3830
L1  - http://www.nber.org/papers/w3830.pdf
N1  - Author contact info:
Alberto F. Alesina
Department of Economics
Harvard University
Littauer Center 210
Cambridge, MA 02138
Tel: 617/495-8388
Fax: 617/495-7730
E-Mail: aalesina@harvard.edu

Gerald D. Cohen
E-Mail: gcohen@zbi.com

Nouriel Roubini
Department of Economics, KMC 7-83
Stern School of Business, New York University
44 West 4th Street
New York, NY  10012
Tel: 212/998-0886
Fax: 212/995-4218
E-Mail: nroubini@stern.nyu.edu
AB  - The purpose of this paper is to test for evidence of opportunistic "political business cycles" in a large sample of 18 OECD economies. Our results can be summarized as follows: 1) We find very little evidence of pre-electoral effects of economic outcomes, in particular, on GDP growth and unemployment; 2) We see some evidence of "political monetary cycles." that is, expansionary monetary policy in election years; 3) We also observe indications of "political budget cycles," or "loose" fiscal policy prior to elections; 4) Inflation exhibits a postelectoral jump, which could be explained by either the preelectoral "loose" monetary and fiscal policies and/or by an opportunistic timing of increases in publicly controlled prices, or indirect taxes.
ER  -