@techreport{NBERw3822,
 title = "Optimal Law Enforcement with Self-Reporting of Behavior",
 author = "Louis Kaplow and Steven Shavell",
 institution = "National Bureau of Economic Research",
 type = "Working Paper",
 series = "Working Paper Series",
 number = "3822",
 year = "1994",
 month = "August",
 URL = "http://www.nber.org/papers/w3822",
 abstract = {Self-reporting -- the reporting by parties of their own behavior to an enforcement authority -- is a commonly observed aspect of law enforcement, as in the context of environmental and safety regulation. We add self-reporting to the model of the control of harmful externalities through probabilistic law enforcement. Optimal self-reporting schemes are characterized and are shown to offer two advantages over schemes without self-reporting: enforcement resources are saved because individuals who are led to report harmful acts need not be identified; risk is reduced because individuals bear certain sanctions when they report their behavior, rather than face uncertain sanctions.},
}