TY  - JOUR
AU  - Currie,Janet
TI  - Rules, Coordination and Manipulability Among Arbitrators
JF  - National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper Series
VL  - No. 3821
PY  - 1991
Y2  - August 1991
UR  - http://www.nber.org/papers/w3821
L1  - http://www.nber.org/papers/w3821.pdf
N1  - Author contact info:
Janet Currie
Princeton University
316 Wallace Hall
Princeton, NJ 08544
Tel: 609-258-7393
Fax: 609-258-5974
E-Mail: jcurrie@princeton.edu
AB  - This paper provides evidence that the variance of arbitrated wage settlements is systematically lower than the variance of wage settlements negotiated without arbitration using a panel of contracts between teachers and school boards in the Canadian province of British Columbia. This finding is interpreted as evidence that arbitrators coordinate their decisions. However, coordination on a rule leaves arbitrators as a group vulnerable to manipulation by coalitions of employers or employees that understand the rule. Because successful manipulation of arbitrators undermines the credibility of the institution, arbitrators as a group have incentives to change their rules from time to time. Evidence is presented that in BC, school boards were more successful than teachers at manipulating arbitrators, and that arbitrators responded by changing their rule.
ER  -