TY  - JOUR
AU  - Polinsky,A. Mitchell
AU  - Rubinfeld,Daniel L.
TI  - A Model of Optimal Fines for Repeat Offenders
JF  - National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper Series
VL  - No. 3739
PY  - 1993
Y2  - November 1993
UR  - http://www.nber.org/papers/w3739
L1  - http://www.nber.org/papers/w3739.pdf
N1  - Author contact info:
A. Mitchell Polinsky
Stanford Law School
Stanford University
Stanford, CA  94305
Tel: 650/723-0886
Fax: 650/723-3557
E-Mail: polinsky@stanford.edu

Daniel L. Rubinfeld
Robert L. Bridges Professor of Law and
Professor of Economics Emeritus
788 Simon Tower, Boalt Hall
University of California, Berkeley
Berkeley, CA 94720
Tel: 510/642-1959
Fax: 510/642-3767
E-Mail: drubinfeld@law.berkeley.edu
AB  - This paper analyzes optimal fines in a model in which individuals can commit up to two offenses. The fine for the second offense is allowed to differ from the fine for the first offense. There are four natural cases in the model, defined by assumptions about the gains to individuals from committing the offense. In the case fully analyzed it may be optimal to punish repeat offenders more severely than first-time offenders. In another case, it may be optimal to impose less severe penalties on repeat offenders. And in the two remaining cases, the optimal penalty does not change.
ER  -