TY  - JOUR
AU  - Ball,Laurence
TI  - Externalities from Labor Mobility
JF  - National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper Series
VL  - No. 3720
PY  - 1991
Y2  - May 1991
UR  - http://www.nber.org/papers/w3720
L1  - http://www.nber.org/papers/w3720.pdf
N1  - Author contact info:
Laurence M. Ball
Department of Economics
Johns Hopkins University
Baltimore, MD 21218
Tel: 410/516-7605
Fax: 410/516-7600
E-Mail: lball@jhu.edu
AB  - This paper assumes that workers can move from a market with high unemployment to one with low unemployment at a cost. In principle. equilibrium mobility can be greater or less than the social optimum. For most plausible parameter values. however. mobility is too low. Intuitively. mobility has a beneficial externality: it helps workers remaining in the high-unemployment market by reducing competition for jobs. Mobility hurts workers in the market that movers join, but this effect is usually smaller.
ER  -